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Abstract
This article, produced as a result of the Symposium on Statistical Inference, is
an introduction to the literature on the function of expertise, judgment, and choice
in the practice of statistics and scientific research. In particular, expert judgment
plays a critical role in conducting Frequentist hypothesis tests and Bayesian models,
especially in selection of appropriate prior distributions for model parameters. The
subtlety of interpreting results is also discussed. Finally, external recommendations
are collected for how to more effectively encourage proper use of judgment in statistics.
The paper synthesizes the literature for the purpose of creating a single reference and
inciting more productive discussions on how to improve the future of statistics and
science.
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1 Introduction
As a quantitative discipline, statistics is often considered by practitioners as objective in its
methods, which proliferate throughout the scientific enterprise. Basic statistical methods,
including Frequentist hypothesis tests and p-values, are ubiquitous in academic literature.
The American Statistical Association (ASA) recently warned the research community about
common misuses of p-values in a statement (Wasserstein & Lazar 2016) that has received
widespread attention in a variety of fields, even outside of statistics. As a follow-up, the
ASA organized the 2017 Symposium on Statistical Inference (SSI), where statisticians and
consumers of data presented research, contemplated these issues, and brainstormed possible
solutions. Yet, the statistical community remains divided on explicit recommendations
for researchers to improve their quantitative practice (Matthews et al. 2017). Due to the
inherently quantitative nature of the field of statistics, much of the conversation on the
p-value statement has revolved around quantitative solutions. Discussions of the statistical
properties of these and other remedies are included elsewhere in this special issue.
Despite perceived objectivity of the field, statisticians previously argued that uncer-
tainty and choice abound in the scientific process, from the definitions of questions of inter-
est to the analysis and interpretation of results (Gelman & Hennig 2017, Goldstein et al.
2006, Berger & Berry 1988). Hence, expert judgment is required to implement scientific
research (Bertolaso & Sterpetti 2017). A session at SSI examined the role of judgment in
statistical and scientific practice. Session participants present their joint expert opinions
on the topic in Brownstein et al. (2018). While preparing the paper, a wealth of related
literature was collected and synthesized. The present article provides an overview of the
literature on the role of expert judgment in statistics and science.
First, section 2 defines expertise as it relates to this paper. Then, sections 3, 4 and 5
discuss the role of expert judgment in Frequentist hypothesis testing, Bayesian inference,
and general interpretation. Recommendations are provided in section 6 for stakeholders in
education, publishing, and funding. Finally, appendices are provided for interested readers
including overviews of the Frequentist and Bayesian paradigms.
2
2 What is Expert Judgment?
Before discussing the role of expert judgment in science, definitions of the relevant terms
are needed. Weinstein (1993) provides the following definitions of expert, expertise, and
expert opinion that are invoked throughout this paper:
1. An individual is an expert in the ‘epistemic’ sense if and only if he or she
is capable of offering strong justifications for a range of propositions in a
domain.
2. An individual is an expert in the ‘performative’ sense if and only if he or
she is able to perform a skill well.
3. A claim is an ‘expert opinion’ if and only if it is offered by an expert, the
expert provides a strong justification for it, and the claim is in the domain
of the expert’s expertise.
4. ‘Expertise’ is the capacity either to offer expert opinions or to demonstrate
one or more skills in a domain, and expertise in a domain does not entail
expertise in the entire range of the domain.
In brief, epistemic experts possesses deep knowledge about a field and are considered cred-
ibile by others (Carrier 2010), while performative experts are adept at completing actions
for the field. The late Stephen Hawking (Gribbin & White 2016) is a famous epistemic
expert in physics. An olympic athlete, such as Usain Bolt (Gómez et al. 2013), exemplifies
performative expertise in their sport. The two types of expertise frequently overlap. Physi-
cians, for instance, are both versed in fields such as anatomy and proficient at diagnosing
ailments, performing medical procedures, and prescribing treatments and cures.
Expert judgment involves one or more evidence-based claims proposed by credible ex-
perts. Judgments may arise when multiple conclusions or actions are possible and supported
by credible evidence. For example, multiple treatments may be possible for a condition,
and two physicians may disagree on the preferred treatment plan for the same patient.
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 relate these definitions to statistics and science.
3
2.1 Statistical expertise
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2018b) defines statistics as “a branch of mathematics
dealing with the collection, analysis, interpretation, and presentation of masses of numeri-
cal data.” In general, like any professional skill, statistical analysis should be conducted by
practitioners who are qualified based on their knowledge of and experience with statistical
procedures and principles. Example key principles include knowledge of modeling assump-
tions and diagnostics, as well as experience using and interpreting statistical software.
Based on the definition of expert in Weinstein (1993), an active statistician, defined
as “one versed in or engaged in compiling statistics” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary
2018a), is clearly considered an expert. Similar to the ability of a primary care doctor
to identify and treat general health needs for their patients, statisticians are trained with
knowledge and skill in choosing, creating, implementing, and validating statistical proce-
dures for a wide variety of settings. Others can be considered statistical experts as well if
they have sufficient relevant knowledge and training in statistical theory and practice. Both
types of expertise are needed for valid statistics, even if divided among multiple people. A
common model is for a person with extensive training in statistical theory to supervise the
study design and statistical analysis, which is executed by an analyst facile in programming.
Statistics is a broad field with numerous subfields, rendering it impossible to know all
aspects of each. Instead, analogous to how physicians choose medical specialties, most
statisticians specialize in one or more subfields, such as genetics, Bayesian modeling, or
survival analysis. Classifications of subfields in statistics are found in Schell (2010) and
De Battisti et al. (2015). Specialized problems require expertise in different types of an-
alytical methods. Identifying and deciding between reasonable analytical choices requires
judgment, as described throughout this paper and highlighted by others (Francis 2017).
2.2 Content expertise
While statisticians are critical members of scientific teams, interdisciplinary collaborations
include experts in multiple fields. For instance, to develop a clinical trial to test an oncology
drug, expertise could be required in fields such as medicine, biology, and genetics. For the
purpose of this article, a content expert, or subject matter expert, has expertise in a field
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of science other than statistics. Content experts are key in advancing scientific endeavors,
such as generating hypotheses based on knowledge of biological mechanisms, designing and
supervising experiments using state of the art laboratory techniques, providing intuition
on clinically meaningful values, and contextualizing statistical results. Communication of
content knowledge to the statistician is also critical, as it insight may shape the study
design and analysis in subtle ways, as described in (Brownstein et al. 2018).
3 Expert Judgment in Hypothesis Testing
This section discusses the judgment of experts as defined in Section 2 for Frequentist hy-
pothesis testing. Topics include the role of expert judgment in hypothesis testing, including
finding balance between between type I and II errors, multiple comparisons adjustment,
and special considerations such as orphan drugs and non-inferiority trials.
3.1 Trade-off Between Type I and II Errors and Two Hypotheses
It is well known that for a fixed sample size, there is a trade-off between minimizing false
positives (type I error) and maximizing true positives (power). Clearly, it is desirable both
to have small error probabilities and high power. One way to minimize the probabilities of
both errors simultaneously is to increase the sample size of an experiment (Asendorpf et al.
2013). However, this solution may not be feasible, as outlined in Section 6.3. Instead, ex-
perts should consider their preferred balance between the two types of errors and design
their experiments appropriately. The statistician is responsible for engaging the subject
matter experts in discussions to determine the levels of each type of error that are scien-
tifically and ethically reasonable for their study. Current methods of using judgment to
balance errors in Frequentist hypothesis testing are discussed along with their implications.
3.1.1 Minimizing Type I Error
For most experiments, the significance level is first set. In other words, the judgment
is that type I errors should be set at a certain low level, after which other considera-
tions can be made. The most famous value is 5%, usually chosen by convention. Rather,
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Lakens et al. (2018) argues that researchers should determine their ideal level for their in-
dividual study beforehand using decision theory and report the decision and methodology
in the manuscript. Unfortunately, this practice is uncommon; brief discussion is provided
in section 3.1.3. Instead, most researchers compare to a single threshold, the customary
value for which is currently under discussion. A summary of the discussion is provided.
Recent concern about the reproducibility in science focuses on the fact that interesting
associations in the literature are not easily replicated in future studies (Ioannidis 2005). A
hypothesized cause is that the observed type I error rate may far exceed that of the nominal
significance level. This hypothesis inspired recent recommendations to drop the most com-
monly used significance level further, e.g. to 0.005 (Benjamin et al. 2017, Johnson et al.
2017, Johnson 2013). The goal is to minimize the probability of a type I error in hopes of
filtering out weak effects and increasing the reproducibility of science as a whole.
On the other hand, there is concern that the reproducibility crisis may be due to a
widespread lack of power due to inadequate power calculations (Marino 2017, Smaldino & McElreath
2016, Asendorpf et al. 2013). Calls to lower the type I error rate have been criticized for
enabling underpowered studies if no other action is taken, such as raising funding levels to
accommodate increased sample sizes (Asendorpf et al. 2013, Lakens et al. 2018). Further,
Lakens et al. (2018) argue that the recommendation may be hurting the very cause that it
champions by decreasing resources and incentives for replication studies.
3.1.2 Minimizing Type II Error
The paradigm of prioritizing a fixed significance level chosen by convention only may be
inappropriate for specific applications, especially if excessive harm could be associated
with a lack of discovery. For example, if the question evaluates the harm of a certain
environmental factor, then the precautionary principle (Fischer & Ghelardi 2016, Fjelland
2016) states that it is better to err on the side of caution, as failing to detect underlying harm
would result in failure to reduce personal harm for individuals currently affected and future
individuals. In these cases, minimizing the type II error probability is judged to be of the
utmost concern. Power calculations necessitate specification of particular realizations of the
alternative hypothesis or effect size. Determination of clinically and statistically meaningful
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effect sizes is highly dependent on the judgment of both statisticians and content experts;
guidance is provided elsewhere (Murphy et al. 2014, Ellis 2010, Lakens 2013).
The story of Love Canal, a suburban neighborhood near Niagra Falls, prioritizes mini-
mization the harm of a type II error over that of a type I error. The general null hypothesis
is the safety of the area; the alternative is an association between toxic chemicals from the
Love Canal and increased cancer prevalence. The relative (bodily) harm of a type II error,
declaring the area safe when it was hazardous to the residents, exceeded the (financial)
harm of a type I error. Initially, an investigation erroneously concluded that the area was
safe. The judgment of experts, namely a scientist with detailed observational data from the
residents, helped diagnose the error in the initial investigation. Eventually, the area was
closed. Briefly, the first study included a reasonable test to answer the wrong question. The
original investigation tested the seemingly intuitive hypothesis that proximity to a chemical
waste site was associated with more negative outcomes. The second investigation refined
the hypothesis, namely that residents in homes near the site built over former stream-beds
were more at risk than homes built over dry land. The latter test found a strong association
based on sound biological principles with clear implications for evacuation prioritization.
A detailed discussion of the story and the role of judgment is found in Fjelland (2016).
Similarly, priorizing power, the United States Food and Drug Administration has a
separate regulatory category for orphan drugs to allow new treatments to have a higher
chance of adoption if no other therapeutic option is available to mitigate a rare condition
(Braun et al. 2010). By definition, small populations of patients with rare conditions may
make traditional recruitment targets infeasible and may require creativity in designing valid
trials. Experts may design lower powered studies, increase the target significance level,
consider alternative or surrogate outcomes, or even develop new methodology for small
samples (Parmar et al. 2016, Billingham et al. 2016). Orphan drugs trials, while usually
relatively small, have sometimes, but not always (Orfali et al. 2012), found to suffer from
methodological shortcomings, such as lack of blinding or randomization (Kesselheim et al.
2011, Bell & Smith 2014). Furthermore, determination of the value of a drug is complex,
based on factors such as disease prevalence, severty, mortality, morbidity, treatment benefit
and safety, and cost effectiveness (Paulden et al. 2015).
7
3.1.3 Minimizing Overall Error
Mudge et al. (2012) recommend to consider the two types of error together and minimize
the overall error rate. Two approaches include averaging the errors themselves and cal-
culating the overall cost based on individual error costs. Similar approaches are applied
in fields such as climate science, where the optimal α level is calculated via simulation
(Kemp 2016). (It is worth noting that in Kemp’s study, α = 0.0052, which was close to
the recommendation by Benjamin et al. 2017) Mudge et al. (2017) even argue that these
methods can simplify analyses with multiple hypothesis tests, which also require judgment
as described in section 3.3. More generally, Grieve (2015) analyze how overall minimization
approaches relate to the likelihood principle and Bayesian decision making. Implications
of minimizing the overall error rate for research outcomes are modeled in Miller & Ulrich
(2016).
3.2 Expert Judgment in Alternative Frameworks: Non-Inferiority
Studies
The two hypotheses (the null and alternative) tested in standard statistical methods serve
different functions, described in the appendix (section 8). Sprenger (2018) elaborates
on the asymmetry between the two hypotheses and the inherent value judgments im-
plicit in Frequentist methods. In non-inferiority trials, the roles of the two hypotheses
are switched. (See the appendix for more details.) Non-inferiority studies require care
in their design, analysis, and interpretation (Mauri & D’Agostino Sr 2017, Fleming et al.
2011, Fleming 2008). Examples include justification of an appropriate comparison group,
choice of endpoint and non-inferiority margins “based on statistical reasoning and clin-
ical judgment” (Fleming 2008), and careful a priori design to handle known challenges
(Mauri & D’Agostino Sr 2017, D’Agostino Sr et al. 2003) Rehal et al. (2016) found that
statistical recommendations are unclear and those that exist aren’t necessarily followed.
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3.3 Multiple Comparisons
While testing multiple hypotheses in a single study is common, how and whether to ad-
just each test in light of the others is a non-trivial question. In certain settings, such
as exploratory research, adjustment may be optional (Wason et al. 2014, Li et al. 2017,
Gelman et al. 2012). Often, whether or not adjustment is needed may require judgment
from a statistical expert about relationships between questions of interest (e.g. correla-
tions or other measures of association). For example, tests comparing the effects of distinct
treatments to a single control may not need adjustment, but tests comparing repeated mea-
surements or multiple outcomes likely do (Candlish et al. 2017, Li et al. 2017, Wason et al.
2014).
Even when is adjustment for multiple comparisons is generally agreed to be important,
expertise is required in specifying an appropriate procedure for a particular problem. One
issue to consider first is the number of tests for which to adjust (primary questions of interest
only, primary and secondary questions, all planned tests, etc.). This issue requires input
from both statisticians and subject matter experts about research priorities. The choice of
adjustment method depends on the desired balance of type I and II errors, as discussed in
Section 3.1. Additional considerations for multiple testing are provided elsewhere (Li et al.
2017, Wason et al. 2014, Alosh & Huque 2009, Proschan & Waclawiw 2000)
3.4 Should a binary decision be made at all?
The p-value was designed as an informal measure of the evidence that could cast doubt on
the null hypothesis, not to inform a binary choice. Fisher (1955) objected to the decision
theory framework of Neyman & Pearson (1928). Christensen (2005) describes a Fisherian
view that, “an α level should never be chosen; that a scientist should simply evaluate the
evidence embodied in the p-value.” The modern use of p-values arguably has lost the em-
phasis on scientific judgment and extrapolates far beyond their intended use. Commentaries
abound on the scientific and moral implications of the abuse of the p-value (Goodman 2016,
Ziliak & McCloskey 2009, Steel et al. 2013, Pittenger 2001, Nickerson 2000, Folger 1989).
This section discusses judgment of of p-values outside of the decision-theory paradigm.
While some authors (e.g. Cumming 2014) and journals (see section 6.3) recommend
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abandoning p-values entirely, others argue that alternatives aren’t necessarily better (Murtaugh
2014, Macnaughton n.d., Ionides et al. 2017, de Valpine 2014). Instead, p-values could be
used in ways other than as sole decision-makers.
First, “borderline” values in either direction could be judged accordingly (Cohen 2011)
with replication studies encouraged to reevaluate the findings. Given the nominal signif-
icance level α is an arbitrary choice, there is little qualitative difference between p-values
in the interval (α − ǫ, α + ǫ), where ǫ is a small number much smaller than the signifi-
cance level. Yet, many researchers, even statisticians (McShane & Gal 2017) reject null
hypotheses corresponding to p-values in the lower half of the interval and fail to reject null
hypotheses corresponding to p-values in the upper half. While intuitively, there is little
difference between p-values of 0.049 and 0.051, papers associated with the former are far
more likely to be published than papers associated with the latter.
Additionally, p-values can be considered just one piece of evidence to be evaluated with
other factors, such as study design quality and effect size (Spurlock 2017, Wasserstein & Lazar
2016). In fact, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion to use statistical infor-
mation as evidence rather than decision tools with blunt cut-offs (Liptak 2011).
4 Expert Judgment in Bayesian Methods
To mitigate problems with Frequentist inference, a large portion of the statistical commu-
nity recommends greater engagement with Bayesian methods (Held & Ott 2018, Page & Satake
2017, Goldstein et al. 2006). The Bayesian paradigm enables more intuitive interpretations
that directly answer questions of interest (Brownstein et al. 2018, Goldstein et al. 2006).
The vast collection of literature on Bayesian methods extends far beyond the scope of the
present paper. Appendix 8.2 provides a brief overview of the Bayesian paradigm.
It is well known that Bayesian statistics requires judgment in the choice of a prior dis-
tribution and that results may be sensitive to the choice of a prior (Gelman & Hennig 2017,
Gelman et al. 2014). Therefore, careful consideration should be paid to the specification
of the prior and its parameters. Determination of a prior requires input from both statis-
ticians and experts in the fields of application. The focus of this section is an overview of
prior development in Bayesian methods with emphasis on expert judgment and choice.
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4.1 Expert Judgment in Choice of a Prior
Priors can be chosen in a variety of ways. Certain “standard” priors may be chosen for math-
ematical elegance, computational simplicity, or posterior robustness. Classes of priors, such
as non-informative priors, conjugate families, and reference priors, are described extensively
elsewhere (Bernardo 1979, Berger & Bernardo 1992, Syversveen 1998, Berger et al. 2009,
DeGroot 2005, Fraser et al. 2010). More commonly, prior distributions and parameters
may be determined from pilot data or other values from the literature. Details on the
field of empirical Bayes, involving priors derived based on the current data, are found in
chapter 5 of Carlin & Louis (2008). Little (2011) describes a hybrid between Bayesian and
Frequentist methods called calibrated Bayes, in which Frequentist methods help determine
the prior for a Bayesian model, which is used for inference. Priors for Bayesian models can
also be chosen to coincide with Frequentist procedures (Daita & Ghosh 1995).
4.1.1 Expertise in Prior Elicitation
Alternatively, experts can directly develop and calibrate a prior distribution for their
project. The process, called elicitation, is detailed in numerous places, such as Morgan
(2014), O’Hagan et al. (2006), Garthwaite et al. (2005) and even in this special issue (O’Hagan
2018). In brief, a facilitator carefully works with content experts to quantify their judgment
about parameters of interest and either directly uses or transforms the elicited densities
into prior distributions for the model. Elicitation, which falls into the subjective Bayesian
paradigm (Goldstein et al. 2006), is used in a variety of fields, such as clinical trials, environ-
mental modeling economics and ecology (Mason et al. 2017, Krueger et al. 2012, O’Hagan
2012, Kuhnert et al. 2010, Martel et al. 2009).
Johnson et al. (2010) urge examination of elicitation methods for validity and reliability.
Morgan (2014) details uses and abuses of elicitation, and Heitjan (2017) provides recent
criticisms. While bias may be induced if elicitation is done poorly (Kynn 2008), elicitation
can be used to estimate and mitigate bias (Turner et al. 2009). In fact, expert judgment
and elicitation is critical to modern practice in environmental modeling (Krueger et al.
2012),
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4.2 Model Checking in the Bayesian Paradigm
Regardless of the type of prior chosen for modeling, Gelman & Shalizi (2013) and Sprenger
(2018) stress the importance of checking that the observed data matches the prior well
enough for the application and considering alternative action if it diverges in key ways. For
another example and discussion of implications for clinical trials when the prior doesn’t
match the observed data, please see Brownstein et al. (2018).
5 Expert Judgment in Interpretation
Interpretation of results involves both knowledge of the statistical modeling process and
broader experience with the subject matter. For example, to understand the results of
a t-test of the null hypothesis that means in two populations are equal, one must first
understand the basics behind hypothesis testing in general as well as assumptions and
considerations specific to the two-sample t-test, such as normally distributed populations
or large samples. Misinterpretation at this stage, such as thinking a p-value means some-
thing it doesn’t, or otherwise wrongly acting on a basic definition (confidence intervals,
odds ratios, areas under ROC curves, etc.), are straightforward to correct with training in
statistical literacy, as discussed in section 6.1. Of course, interpretation requires more than
simply correctly applying definitions. Contextualizing results requires content expertise
within the scientific field. Both types of expertise are required for other aspects, such as
planning an analysis and evaluating potential bias, to name a few. This section focuses
on examples including post-hoc difficulties with the planned analysis and missing data.
Additional biases in interpretation of scientific evidence are examined in Kaptchuk (2003).
Choices abound in designing a study, from the experimental design to the statisti-
cal analysis and interpretation; these choices require scientific judgment. (Please see
Brownstein et al. 2018 for details). Ideally, content experts and statisticians should jointly
define and prioritize scientific questions and plan statistically valid, practical, and inter-
pretable methods to answer them. Examples requiring judgment include decisions on the
number and type of primary questions of interest, defining practically significant effect
sizes on which to base sample size calculations, and whether and when to conduct interim
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analyses.
A statistical analysis plan (SAP) is a formal document written prior to a study that
describes the planned protocol. Adams-Huet & Ahn (2009) provide guidance for clinicians
to work with statisticians in writing SAPs. Detailed SAPs are important to safeguard
teams from changing their analyses after seeing the data (Finfer & Bellomo 2009). Such
changes bias results and reduce reliability and validity.
Even with a well-written SAP, difficulties may arise. For instance, interpretation of
the SAP for adjudication of complex potential events may be difficult. In one example,
a single complex case in a clinical trial required an extensive investigation to interpret
the statistical analysis plan properly (Gibson et al. 2017). In fact, the status of the single
patient determined whether or not the p-value fell below the a priori defined significance
level! When possible, SAPs can include strategies for dealing with missing or ambiguous
data, such as sensitivity analyses, multiple imputation.
Another area which may necessitate careful statistical consideration is in the presence of
excessive missing data. While a full review of missing data is outside of the scope of this pa-
per, readers may consult Little & Rubin (2014). Briefly, analysis with missing data requires
consideration of potential relationships between missing observations and the variables in
the study. Standard methods can be complicated if missing data arises in non-random
ways. As an illustrative example, the gold standard diagnosis of temporomandibular disor-
ders (TMD) requires an invasive examination by an expert dentist (Dworkin 2010); missing
data arises when subjects who are suspected to be new cases fail to complete the examina-
tion (Slade et al. 2013). The research team showed that the proportion of missing data was
large, the assumptions of standard methods were violated, and new methods were required
for modeling in the presence of the missing data (Brownstein et al. 2015, Bair et al. 2013).
Recommendations, detailed further in section 6, include experimental protocols to check
for and minimize missing data during data collection, and a priori plans (including existing
methods or development of new methods) to handle analyses with missing data.
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6 Recommendations from the Literature
Commentary on the role of statistical inference in the reproducibility crisis includes calls
to action for members of the scientific community, including educational reform, improved
standards for publication and funding and incentives for scientists. Section 6.1.1 details rec-
ommendations for statistics education, especially regarding teaching statistical inference to
students not planning to become statisticians. Section 6.1.2 focuses on how to train statis-
ticians with an eye toward improving reproducibility. Sections 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 synthesize
recommendations for stakeholders to facilitate better research practice for all fields.
6.1 Educational Interventions
The need for better statistical training in many fields has been discussed (Ogino & Nishihara
2016, Sørensen & Rothman 2010, Peng 2015). Other fields are recognizing the impor-
tance of detail at each step of the research progress (Shipworth & Huebner 2018). Indeed,
Crane & Martin (2018) claim that statistical training can “[empower] scientists to make
sound judgements.” Educational programs are discussed for scientists inside and out of
statistics.
6.1.1 Educational Reform: Teaching Statistics for Practitioners
Despite the tendency for misuse among practitioners (Colquhoun 2017, Gardenier & Resnik
2002) and even statisticians (McShane & Gal 2017), basic statistical inference procedures
and the accompanying p-values remain ubiquitous. One facilitator of the presence of sig-
nificance tests is their central role in introductory courses and ease of implementation
in statistical software (Searle 1989, Dallal 1990). In fact, the “cook-book” approach to
statistical analysis commonly taught in introductory courses (Gigerenzer 2004) tempts re-
searchers to apply basic procedures without investigating model diagnostics (Steel et al.
2013) or considering the appropriateness of the procedures for particular applications.
Crane & Martin (2018) and Brown & Kass (2009) stress that students in statistics
courses should learn how to think critically. Furthermore, “statistical practice is com-
plex, relying on nuanced principles honed through years of experience” (Crane & Martin
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2018). In writing their guidelines to weed researchers, Onofri et al. (2010) make the follow-
ing statement, “We would like to reinforce the idea that statistical methods are not a set
of recipes whose mindless application is required by convention; each experiment or study
may involve subtleties that these guidelines cannot cover.”
Paralleling the discussion for research, curriculum reform discussions are ongoing (Gould, Wild, Baglin, McNamara, Ridgway & McConway
2018, Park 2018, Gould, Peng, Kreuter, Pruim, Witmer & Cobb 2018). Example remedies
for teaching students to use better judgment include increased focus on effect sizes and con-
fidence intervals (Calin-Jageman 2017, Fritz et al. 2012), greater attention to the Bayesian
paradigm (Page & Satake 2017), and practical demonstrations (Park 2018, Mitchell 2018).
Beyond the classroom, recommendations for biomedical scientists include programs on
experimental design for both students and mentors, emphasis on methodology in journal
clubs, developing continuing education materials as new methods arise, and increasing
training for peer reviewers (Casadevall & Fang 2016). It is especially important to better
train peer reviewers in all fields to enforce statistical standards in published literature (Peng
2015). Scientists can pursue additional formal statistical training while in graduate school
or postdoctoral programs through funded mechanisms, such as NIH T32 training grants.
However, the implementation of these specialized programs requires care to prevent trainees
from simply learning a small amount of statistical tools and more confidently using them
even when the tools are inappropriate for future problems (Gelfond et al. 2011). Bell et al.
(2013) recommend both improved statistical training for content experts and continued
collaboration with biostatisticians throughout the research process.
6.1.2 Improved Training for Quantitative Scientists
Statisticians serve as collaborators in a wide variety of fields, some of which strongly rec-
ommend or even require a statistician on the team (Obremskey & Archer 2011, Bell et al.
2013). Consequently, proper training for statisticians and other quantitative science is
paramount. Recognizing the widespread need for biostatistics in research and health prac-
tice as early as the 1960s, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) created biostatistics
training programs (Hemphill 1961). A more modern overview of training opportunities for
biostatisticians is included in Kennedy et al. (2007)
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Often working in fields outside of their primary educational training, statisticians should
strive to continually learn about the subject-matter problems at hand (Brown & Kass
2009). Brown & Kass (2009) encourage graduate students in statistics to pursue a second
program of study in joint or separate programs focused on the subject matter of their
future research. Training opportunities, such as NIH K25, are available for this purpose, as
described in Pickering et al. (2015). Formal training in a second field may not be feasible for
all statisticians. However, applied practitioners could instead be encouraged to concentrate
their collaborations in a small number of areas where they can slowly gain deeper familiarity
with the scientific content, rather than to consult in a large number of disciplines where
such depth is infeasible. In fact, this recommendation is often communicated in informal
settings to junior faculty members with foci in applied statistics.
In addition, statisticians should hone their soft skills, especially listening, communica-
tion, and leadership skills (Gibson et al. 2017, Califf 2016). While listening and communi-
cation are obviously essential for collaboration, leadership training can provide statisticians
with the tools and confidence to continually and actively shape the statistical validity of a
project from its inception. In her March 2018 president’s corner article of AMSTAT news,
LaVange (2018) reiterated the importance of leadership in biostatistics and announced the
ASA’s vision for a new leadership initiative. As an example of the addition of soft skills to
the curriculum, the biostatistics department at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill previously offered a course in leadership (LaVange et al. 2012).
6.1.3 Using Science to Develop Interventions for Scientists
A final idea about educational interventions is to study the research process scientifically
and use the findings to improve training. Leek et al. (2017) summarized the state of affairs
with a few apt quotes:
“The root problem is that we know very little about how people analyse and
process information... We need to appreciate that data analysis is not purely
computational and algorithmic — it is a human behaviour... We need more ob-
servational studies and randomized trials — more epidemiology on how people
collect, manipulate, analyse, communicate and consume data. We can then use
16
this evidence to improve training programmes for researchers and the public.”
To this end, in addition to actions described in section 6.2, funders could seek studies of
scientific judgment with components to develop training materials based on the findings.
6.2 Funding Agencies
Due to the fact that funding is often necessary for research and highly valued or even re-
quired for promotions, funding agencies should take an active role in defining standards. To
this end, the NIH defined guidelines for increased rigor, transparency and reproducibility
(Hewitt et al. 2017, Collins & Tabak 2014). The NSF followed with guidelines to encourage
data sharing and citation (Stan Ahalt et al. 2015). The ASA defined its own recommended
actions for funding agencies to improve reproducibility, including funding mechanisms for
training in reproducible research methods, development of reproducible software, repli-
cation studies (Broman et al. 2017). Actions by funding agencies should catalyze more
widespread adoption of the recommendations for scientific rigor.
6.3 Journal Guidelines
Changes in publication standards percolate to the scientific practice of authors, as opined
by Asher (1993) over two decades ago. In fact, this special TAS issue stems from high
profile journal articles and rules. Namely, after Nuzzo (2014) bemoaned the ritual, often
thoughtless, use of p-values, the editors of Basic and Applied Social Psychology banned
p-values in manuscripts submitted thereafter (Trafimow & Marks 2015, Trafimow 2014).
Recently, in BMC Medical Research Methodology, hypothesis testing has been “discouraged”
(Hanin 2017). This section considers journal guidelines and their implications.
A recent set of journal guidelines for more careful publication practices (McNutt 2014)
has been adopted by hundreds of journals thus far (Hewitt et al. 2017). Similarly, BMC
Medical Research Methodology (Hanin 2017) advises authors that “Health care decisions
[should be] based on... a combination of statistical and biomedical evidence.” Sørensen & Rothman
(2010) propose that statistical training for journal editors could enable editors to better
enforce statistical standards for publication in the journals that they oversee.
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Journal guidelines include calls for transparency, including sharing of data and code,
such as with pre-submission check-lists to ensure key aspects are considered (McNutt 2014).
Other key aspects include reporting and justification of sample size calculations, randomiza-
tion and blinding procedures, and inclusion and exclusion criteria (Asendorpf et al. 2013).
Finally, emphasis can shift from inference to parameter estimation. (Asendorpf et al. 2013,
McNutt 2014). These guidelines encourage authors to confront, acknowledge and justify
the scientific judgments used in their studies and enable others to examine or reproduce
their findings. The recommendations will likely improve rigor throughout science. Yet,
implications from guidelines of some journals (Hanin 2017, Trafimow 2014) to avoid sharp
thresholds for statistical inference is unclear, underlying a large portion of this special issue.
6.3.1 Transparency
Because statistics requires choices throughout the process, statistics has elements of subjec-
tivity and objectivity, and Gelman & Hennig (2017) argue that the discussion of relative
subjectivity and objectivity is distracting from solutions for best research practices, in-
cluding transparency. Instead, paralleling the aim of journals to strive for transparency,
Gelman & Hennig (2017) detail principles for which to strive during analysis, including,
among others, acknowledgment and investigation of multiple perspectives, impartiality in
decision making, and transparency in reporting. In brief, they argue that statistical judg-
ment is inevitable, and therefore, the those judgments should be detailed and shared for
future evaluation. Gibson (2017) stresses that statisticians should communicate “relative
advantages” and disadvantages of each choice.
It has been shown that not only are descriptions of methods sections insufficiently
detailed, but the quality of the reporting, methodology, and analysis are not necessarily
associated with increased visibility (Nieminen et al. 2006). In addition, poor descriptions
or unwillingness to share data may be associated with author concern over the robustness
of results, especially for borderline results (Wicherts et al. 2011). This may be related to
the need discussed in section 6.1 to increase statistical literacy broadly across other fields
and professions. Statisticians can serve key roles as co-investigators by co-writing methods
sections with sufficient detail for reproducibility, as peer reviewers who are specially trained
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to look for detail in reporting of study design, methods, and results, and as mentors and
teachers who help others improve the completeness of the writing and peer review skills.
The ASA statement urges that “Proper inference requires full reporting and trans-
parency.” Others similarly recommend increased transparency of study design and analysis
(Gelman & Hennig 2017, Greenland et al. 2016, Peng 2015, McNutt 2014, Asendorpf et al.
2013), which would allow readers of the literature to evaluate findings in light of the
strength of the methodology. There are even journals dedicated to reporting raw data
(Data in Brief - Making Your Data Count 2014, Wang 2014), but data sharing is not yet
widely adopted (Vasilevsky et al. 2017). Calls for transparency in research mirror calls
nearly a decade ago for transparency in journalism (Weinberger 2009). However, others
point out that too much a priori fixation and reporting of analysis plans stifles discovery
(Poole 2010), and transparency alone cannot overcome poor data quality (Gelman 2017).
6.4 Interaction Between Groups
Clearly, changes to scientific and statistical standards will require coordination and buy-
in from multiple groups concurrently, ensure that changes improve scientific practice as a
whole (Ioannidis 2014, Sørensen & Rothman 2010). Asendorpf et al. (2013) include an ex-
cellent summary of recommended changes for these groups. Importantly, Smaldino & McElreath
(2016) point out that incentives of various groups may conflict, such as funding agencies
requesting publications from their grantees but not necessary checking the publication qual-
ity. As another example of potential misalignment of incentives, a seemingly simple solution
advocated in Asendorpf et al. (2013) to increase sample sizes across science would improve
reproducibility by improving power overall and likely subsequently increase the proportion
of reported discoveries that are true. On the other hand, as the cost of each additional study
participant may be large, increasing sample sizes may pose financial difficulties for already
strained funding bodies. If total budgets were not increased, then requiring studies to be
larger (and thus more expensive) could result in fewer projects funded. Such a consequence
would negatively impact individual researchers who would face increased competition for
comparatively fewer grants. Additional discussion of guidelines and their implications for
various groups is found in Williams et al. (2018).
19
7 Conclusion
There is broad consensus that rigorous statistical practice and teaching require a mixture of
technical knowledge, communication skills, and the ability to interpret data. The present
paper highlights the less frequently discussed presence of choice and judgment in scientific
and statistical practice. The universe of potential methods for analysis is large, and deciding
among the options is challenging, even for experts (Gelman 2014). Properly synthesizing
expert judgment along with quantitative tools is critical for high quality evidence-based
research. Failure to appropriately capitalize on statistical and scientific judgment could
further erode public trust in science (Spiegelhalter 2017, Saltelli & Funtowicz 2017) and
policy (Sutherland et al. 2015, Weinberg & Elliott 2012). More importantly, scientists have
an ethical obligation to conduct valid statistical analyses, which eventually have broader
societal impacts (Shmueli 2017, Zook et al. 2017, Gelfond et al. 2011).
Rather than argue for a single solution to the problem of improving quantitative prac-
tice, this paper collects in a single document many of the thoughts on expert judgment and
recommendations in statistics. (In a related piece submitted to this special issue, a strong
statement on expert judgement in science with example applications by participants in the
SSI is provided in Brownstein et al. 2018.) The present article gives the reader a starting
point to understand the vast literature related to expert judgment in statistics. Viewpoints
are highly diverse, indicating that there is much more work to be done toward develop-
ing concise, unified recommendations for improved methods. The author intends for the
present paper to facilitate ongoing discussions of expert judgment and recommendations
to improve statistical practice in the twenty-first century and beyond.
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8 Appendix: The Basics and Philosophy of Hypothesis
Testing
Hypothesis testing compares two hypotheses, called the null and the alternative. Two
paradigms are presented for comparing the hypotheses using data collected in scientific
experiments. Other overviews are found elsewhere, e.g. Greenland & Poole (2010-2011).
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8.1 The Frequentist Paradigm
In Frequentist hypothesis testing, the null hypothesis is considered the default, assumed to
be true unless the data casts doubt on it. The alternative hypothesis is often what a content
expert may hope to conclude is true by casting doubt on the null hypothesis. For example,
the developer of a new cancer treatment may compare changes in tumor size for patients
randomized to either their new treatment or a placebo. In this case, the null hypothesis is
that average change in tumor size is identical for patients randomized to both interventions,
and the alternative hypothesis is that the change in tumor size differs based on whether
the patents were randomized to the new drug or a placebo. Put another way, the drug
developer hopes to convince regulatory bodies that their drug is effective by casting doubt
on the default theory that the effect of the drug is identical to the effect of a placebo.
If one assumes that the two (mutually exclusive) hypotheses exhaust reasonable possi-
bilities, then exactly one of the hypotheses should be true and the other should be false.
The practitioner either rejects or fails to reject the null hypothesis based on the evidence
in the experiment. While the hope is that the conclusion aligns with the (unknown) truth,
two errors can take place. The first, called a type I error, occurs when the null hypothesis
is true, but the practitioner rejects the null hypothesis. The second, called a type I error,
occurs when the alternative hypothesis is true, but the practitioner fails to reject the null
hypothesis. Type I errors can be conceptualized as false positives, while type II errors can
be considered false negatives. The significance level is the probability of a type I error.
Power, equal to the probability of the complement of a type II error, is the probability of
(correctly) rejecting the null hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is true.
For a fixed sample size, type I and type II errors are inversely related (when one in-
creases, the other decreases), and the appropriate balance should be decided carefully.
Typically, type I error is set at an appropriate value to minimize the occurrence of false
discoveries, which are typically considered worse than missing a true discovery. The sam-
ple size for the experiment is then set based on both the significance level (e.g. 5%) and a
desired level of power (e.g. 80%) under a specified realization of the alternative hypothe-
sis. Alternatively, often in the presence of extremely limited resources, power is calculated
based on the fixed significance level and the maximum sample size considered feasible.
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The significance level is arbitrary, but 5% has been the most frequently adopted value
by tradition (Ziliak & McCloskey 2009). The idea is that the probability of falsely rejecting
the null hypothesis, e.g. concluding that an association of interest in the study is present in
the population when in reality no such association exists, needs to be minimized. Otherwise,
not only will the original findings mislead the research community, but future research will
be designed based on the previous (incorrect) findings.
As detailed in Motulsky (2014), one can conceive of the Frequentist hypothesis frame-
work as similar to a jury evaluating the evidence in a criminal trial: the defendant is
presumed by default not to be guilty of the crime and is only deemed to be guilty of the
crime if there is sufficient evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In the court room,
wrongful convictions are considered worse than failing to convict a person who committed
a crime in the presence of insufficient evidence. Similarly, type I errors are typically set at
lower rates (e.g. 5%) than type II errors (10% or 20%). Additional connections between
statistics and law and examples for teaching are provided in Byun & Croucher (2018).
It is important to note that the null and alternative hypotheses serve different functions
and are not interchangeable. A common misconception is to interpret a failure to reject
the null hypothesis as “accepting the null hypothesis.” Critically, p-values do not quantify
the evidence in favor of the null hypothesis, analogous to the fact that criminal trials never
claim to prove the innocence of a client and merely deliver verdicts without convictions as
as “not guilty” (Motulsky 2014). In some cases, the order of the hypotheses may need to
be flipped, such as for non-inferority trials, where the goal is to disprove the notion that
a generic compound differs from the original version in favor of the alternative that the
two compounds are sufficiently similar. Thus the framework, analysis, and interpretation
of non-inferiority studies differ markedly from the standard hypothesis testing framework.
The body of the paper discusses an inverse relationship between type I and type II errors
when the sample size is fixed. Exacerbating the trade-off is the fact that most research
aims to answer more than one question of interest, and therefore, a significant portion of
the literature includes more than one hypothesis test. The family-wise error rate, defined
as the probability of having at least one type I error among a fixed number of tests, is
known to be higher than the nominal significance level of any single test, as shown in
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Li et al. (2017). In fields, such as genomics, with a large number of planned hypothesis
tests, adjusted methods aim to control the false discovery rate, defined as the proportion of
the null hypotheses that are true among all tests for which the null hypotheses is rejected
(Benjamini & Hochberg 1995). It is important to note that family-wise error rates and false
discovery rates are not equivalent. Calculation of the false discovery rate utilizes Bayes’
rule and necessitates a judgment on the proportion of null hypotheses that are true.
8.2 The Bayesian Paradigm
As described in Section 8.1, the Frequentist paradigm answers questions about the data
assuming that one of the competing hypotheses is true. In particular, a p-value quantifies
the evidence an experiment produces assuming that the null hypothesis is true. In reality,
even after the experiment is complete, the research team cannot definitively answer the
question of whether or not the null hypothesis is true. It is intuitively more desirable to
quantify and compare the posterior probabilities of each hypothesis conditional on the data
from the experiment. The Bayesian paradigm provides methodology for this framework.
Consider the example from Section 8.1 of a new oncology drug. Under the Bayesian
paradigm, a quantity of interest is the posterior probability of the null hypothesis that
the drug and placebo change tumor size by amounts that are nearly identical (up to a
range) based on the data from the patients in the trial and the previously hypothesized
efficacy of the drug. Similarly of interest is the posterior probability that the drug reduces
the tumor size by a greater margin than the placebo conditional on the observed data.
The drug developer hopes to convince regulatory bodies that their drug is effective by
directly calculating the posterior probability, based on the results of the trial, that there is
a meaningful underlying difference in treatment response between their drug and a placebo.
Another key difference between Bayesian and Frequentist methodology is dependence of
Bayesian posterior probabilities on a prior distribution. The prior specifies the probability
that the null hypothesis is true (or false). Another quantity of interest in this paradigm is
the Bayes factor, which is the ratio of the likelihood of the data under one hypothesis to
the likelihood of the data under the other hypothesis. The philosophy behind the Bayes
factor is detailed in Morey et al. (2016).
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More generally, Bayesian methods involve specification for the parameters of interest.
In the presence of nuisance parameters, i.e. parameters that are not of interest themselves
but must be defined to answer the question of interest, this endeavor may be especially
challenging (Fraser et al. 2010, Tibshirani 1989). Further details on the Bayesian paradigm
and how to implement Bayesian models may be found in a variety of sources, such as
textbooks by Gelman et al. (2014) and Carlin & Louis (2008).
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